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I. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the expenditure decisions of English local authorities has
assumed great importance as central government has sought to exercise
increasing control over the activities of local government. In particular, in a
variety of contexts, central government has sought to estimate from empirical
observation what a local authority ‘ought’ to spend. Unfortunately, such an
undertaking is becoming increasingly complex, as the influence of previous
government policy itself assumes greater importance in local authority
expenditure decisions. For example, central government grant allocations to
local authorities are based on a simple statistical analysis of previous spending
patterns. These grant allocations will to some extent influence current spending.
The expenditure responses in turn are likely to affect future grant allocations,
and so the cycle continues. Such circularity formed an important component of
criticisms of current local government finance arrangements by the Audit
Commission (1993) and the House of Commons Select Committee on the
Environment (1994). This paper seeks to underline the difficulties by
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demonstrating the statistical methods that are required to model spending
patterns amongst non-metropolitan districts satisfactorily.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II gives the background to
the paper, including a short history of central government initiatives to curb local
authority spending. Sections III and IV describe the system of needs assessments
and expenditure limits as applicable to the 296 English non-metropolitan
districts. This is followed in Section V by the formal development of our model
of expenditure. The methods used to make the empirical application operational
are described in Section VI. Results and a discussion in Section VII conclude the
paper.
II. BACKGROUND
For much of the time since the election of a Conservative government in 1979,
local government expenditure has been at the centre of British political debate.
In particular, central government has sought persistently and strenuously to
reduce the level of local government expenditure, which accounts for about 11
per cent of gross domestic product. For its part, local government has equally
vigorously argued that the need for its services is increasing, and that the scope
for efficiency savings is limited. In practice, local government expenditure
increased in real terms at the rate of about 2.2 per cent per annum over the period
1979–93 (Smith, 1993).
In its efforts to restrain expenditure increases, central government has
introduced a series of policy initiatives directed at English local government,
which are described in full in the series of annual reports on local government
finance produced by the Association of County Councils (various dates). The
most important developments in England have been as follows:
1981–82 A revision to the system of grants-in-aid to local governments, whereby an explicit
‘grant-related expenditure assessment’ (GREA) was announced by the government
for each local authority. The GREA was intended to indicate the government’s
estimate of the level of expenditure required to deliver a ‘standard’ level of services,
given the locality’s needs,, as measured by social and economic indicators. The
system of GREAs lasted until 1990.
1982–83 The announcement by the government of an expenditure ‘target’ for each local
authority,, based in part on its past expenditure and in part on its GREA (Smith and
Stewart,, 1985). Expenditure in excess of the target resulted in the loss of grant-in-
aid. Targets were abandoned in 1986.
1985–86 The introduction of ‘rate-capping’, whereby the Secretary of State for the
Environment could limit the local tax rate (and therefore the expenditure) of
individual local authorities. The limitation was initially applied retrospectively to a
small number of jurisdictions. However, since 1991, expenditure limits have been
announced in advance for all local authorities.Local Government Budgetary Choices
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1986–87 The abolition by the government of the Greater London Council and six
metropolitan county councils. Their responsibilities were devolved to individual
district authorities or joint boards. The explicit objective of this move was to reduce
aggregate local government expenditure (Travers, 1986).
1990–91 The replacement of the local residential property tax (the rates) by a ‘community
charge’ (the poll tax), and the abolition of the local business property tax. Again,
the principal objective was to secure reductions in local government expenditure. At
the same time, GREAs were replaced by standard spending assessments (SSAs),
which served a similar purpose to GREAs but which were intended to be simpler.
The poll tax was a policy disaster (Butler, Adonis and Travers, 1994), and was
replaced in 1993 by the council tax. However, SSAs were retained.
1991–92 The imposition of prospective expenditure limitation on all local governments,
whereby expenditure limits are announced in advance of local authority budgeting.
1993–94 The replacement of the poll tax by the ‘council tax’, a form of residential property
tax with upper and lower limits, and a 25 per cent discount for single-person
households (Department of the Environment, 1991).
Furthermore, for much of this period, the government steadily reduced the
proportion of local government expenditure supported by central grant-in-aid,
from a level of 55 per cent in 1981–82 to 43 per cent in 1989–90 (Smith, 1993).
However, this policy was abruptly reversed with the abolition of the local
business rate in 1990–91 and a large injection of central government grant-in-aid
in 1991–92 for the purpose of reducing poll tax levels. Approximately 79 per
cent of local expenditure is now effectively supported by central grant-in-aid.
The government tried some other initiatives to reduce expenditure, such as a
requirement for local authorities to publish comparative performance data.
However, these appear to have had a negligible effect. Moreover, the effects of
government policies may not always have been as intended. For example, Smith
(1989) argues that some of the measures described above may have introduced
dynamic incentives for local authorities to increase expenditure levels. However,
most commentators would agree that — one way or another — much of central
government policy towards local government finance has indeed had a profound
impact on local government expenditure and services (Butler, Adonis and
Travers, 1994).
Two particular developments appear to have had a pervasive effect on
expenditure levels. The first is the central role given since 1981 to central
government’s estimates of the annual expenditure requirements of individual
local authorities, now known as the standard spending assessments. These ‘needs
assessments’ were originally used to calculate authorities’ entitlements to grant-
in- aid. However, they are now put to a number of other important uses, most
importantly setting expenditure limits for local authorities. As documented by
the Audit Commission (1993), this has placed an immense burden on the needs
assessments in a situation where the determinants of local government
expenditure are not yet clearly understood.Fiscal Studies
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Prima-facie evidence of the importance of SSAs in determining spending
levels is illustrated in Table 1, which shows the distribution of spending in
relation to SSA amongst the 296 non-metropolitan districts between 1981–82
and 1994–95. The table illustrates that, since 1991–92 — the first year of
universal expenditure limitation — needs assessments and expenditure have
converged. As the Audit Commission (1993) explains, much of this convergence
appears to have been because SSAs have moved towards expenditure, rather than
vice versa. However, the Audit Commission also presents compelling survey
evidence that spending in turn is being influenced by SSAs.
The second development on which we focus is the universal expenditure
limitation now in force. The last column of Table 1 gives the number of local
authorities that have been directly affected by expenditure limitation. Up to
1990–91, such limitation was imposed retrospectively, and the rules for a local
authority qualifying for limitation were not known in advance of budgeting. As a
result, many local authorities that were not formally subject to limitation may
nevertheless have adjusted spending levels to avoid being caught by expected
limitation rules. Since 1991, the rules have been announced in advance of
budgeting, and the table therefore gives the number of authorities spendingLocal Government Budgetary Choices
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within 0.1 per cent of their expenditure limit.
2 Again, the fact that many local
authorities spent up to their limits is clear prima-facie evidence that expenditure
limitation has affected many budgeting decisions.
The profound impact of central government policy on expenditure choices
can be confirmed by casual observation of budgeting debates within almost any
local authority and by observational case studies (Elcock and Jordan, 1987). It
would therefore appear that any attempt to study spending patterns in local
government should take full account of central government policy influences on
local government spending choices.
There are many reasons why it may be desirable to gain a thorough
understanding of all the influences on local authority expenditure choices. For
example, in calculating an authority’s SSA, central government has attempted to
identify the local costs of delivering a ‘standard’ level of services. In order to do
this, it first identifies a set of drivers of expenditure needs — or standard
spending indicators — which are typically measures of demographic and socio-
economic circumstances (Society of County Treasurers, 1992). A link must then
be made between these `needs indicators’ and an expected spending level,
required to satisfy those needs with some standard level of service. This link is
usually established using statistical techniques — typically regression-based
methods — an approach which implicitly assumes that the national average
response to needs indicators reflects the standard level of service (Department of
the Environment, 1995).
3
Similarly, a strong understanding of expected spending levels is required by
the Audit Commission, the body charged with promoting the economy,
efficiency and effectiveness of local authorities. The Audit Commission will
often find it helpful to assess the spending needs in an area as a prelude to
coming to a judgement about the relative performance of the local authority. In
order to do this, it may wish to abstract as far as possible from government
policy influences on spending amongst the local authority of interest and the
local authorities with which it might be compared.
The traditional method of assessing local authority expenditure responses to
central government policy is to build conventional economic models in which a
local authority utility function (typically reflecting the utility of a representative
voter) is maximised subject to the relevant local authority budget constraint
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(Foster, Jackman and Perlman, 1980). This method lends itself to empirical
estimation, and numerous models of local government expenditure responses in
the 1980s have been developed (Barnett, Levaggi and Smith, 1992). Underlying
these models is the assumption that the finance system is given exogenously, and
that local authorities myopically seek to maximise some measure of utility within
that system. However, from the discussion above, it is clear that, in practice,
central government policy may itself have been in part formed by local
government expenditure responses. That is, using the econometric jargon, some
parts of the finance system may be endogenous.
This being the case, conventional methods of analysing local authority
expenditure are likely to be inadequate. The purpose of this paper is to model the
determinants of local expenditure using the principles outlined above, but taking
account of possible endogeneity. Furthermore, we must accommodate the
truncated budget constraint brought about by expenditure limitation. This
complication alone renders conventional regression methods inappropriate.
Therefore, as well as altering the form of the model, these considerations
considerably complicate the estimation methods needed for empirical purposes.
The outcome of the analysis is a model of expenditure that seeks to explain the
importance of the following factors in forming expenditure choices: needs
assessments, expenditure limits, local income levels, and other socio-economic
factors. As a prelude, the next two sections describe in more detail the two
important factors described above: standard spending assessments and
expenditure limitation.
III. STANDARD SPENDING ASSESSMENTS
As noted above, SSAs have played a pivotal role in central government’s
attempts to restrain local expenditure. Originally they were intended ‘to
represent the amount of revenue expenditure which it would be appropriate for
the authority to incur in that year to provide a standard level of service consistent
with the Secretary of State’s view of the amount of revenue expenditure which it
would be appropriate for all local authorities to incur’ (Association of County
Councils, 1990). In a recent change, the government has redefined the SSA to be
‘the amount which the Government considers appropriate for each authority to
calculate as its budget requirement ... consistent with the amount the
Government considers it would be appropriate for all authorities to incur’
(Department of the Environment, 1995). This definition explicitly omits mention
of `standard’ levels of service. However, such standards continue to be implicit
in the methodologies adopted. In practice, SSAs (i) serve as a bench-mark for
assessing the level of a jurisdiction’s overspending, (ii) are central to the
calculation of an area’s entitlement to grant-in- aid and (iii) have become the
primary determinant of an area’s expenditure limit.Local Government Budgetary Choices
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Separate SSAs are calculated, using a variety of methodologies, for the
following services: education, personal social services, police, fire, highways,
capital financing, and a heterogeneous group of all `other’ services, which
include refuse collection, planning and economic development, housing, and
various administrative services. The 296 non-metropolitan districts in England
— the subject of this study — are not responsible for any of the first five
services, and so the only SSAs relevant to this study are the capital financing
SSA and the other services SSA.
The capital financing SSA is a relatively minor item, relating to £170 million
of non-metropolitan district expenditure in England in the year under study
(1992–93). The principal determinant of a district’s capital financing SSA is the
previous level of its debt. The other services SSA, however, accounts for £2,605
million across England, and is therefore by far the more important component of
a district’s total SSA.
In the year to be studied, the basic component of the other services SSA was
the total population of a local authority area. This was then weighted by a
‘needs’ index, which in 1992–93 had three important components: a measure of
the density of the area, a measure of the sparsity of population,
4 and an ‘all ages
social index’ comprising a linear combination of the following five social
variables from the 1981 Census of Population (Society of County Treasurers,
1992):
!  the proportion of persons sharing accommodation;
!  the proportion of persons lacking a bath or WC;
!  the proportion of persons in lone-parent households;
!  the proportion of persons with more than one person per room;
!  the proportion of persons whose head of household was born in the New
Commonwealth or Pakistan.
The five variables forming the all ages social index were standardised and
summed (they were therefore effectively given an equal weight in the index).
The index was then combined with the density and sparsity measures to yield the
district’s needs weighting.
The choice of the three factors in the calculation of the SSA (and the relative
weights given to them) is a policy decision that emerges from discussions
between central and local government, but in practice such decisions are heavily
influenced by past actual spending patterns. Indeed, there has been considerable
unease about the methodology used to calculate SSAs, culminating in a report by
the House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment (1994). In
particular, the Committee highlighted the ‘growing danger of circularity’
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between SSAs and actual spending, described in our opening paragraph. For this
reason, if the SSA is entered in any model of expenditure choices, it is important
to accommodate the possibility that it may be determined endogenously.
A local authority’s total SSA is used to calculate its entitlement to central
government grant-in-aid as follows. Central government chooses a national
standard tax rate, t*, to apply to all local authorities. Then the grant entitlement,
Gi, of authority i is as follows:
(1) Gi = SSAi - t*.RBi
where RBi is the resource base available to authority i. Thus the grant is intended
to compensate for the difference between an authority’s assessed need (SSA) and
its ability to raise the necessary finance using a standard rate of taxation. The
grant system therefore simultaneously equalises for differences in assessed
spending needs and differences in resources between authorities.
IV. EXPENDITURE LIMITATION
The government assumed the power to limit the tax rates (and therefore
effectively expenditure) of local governments in the 1984 Rates Act. Criteria for
capping individual authorities’ tax rates were announced after budgets had been
set. The powers were first invoked in 1985–86, when 18 local governments
(including four non-metropolitan districts) were instructed to reduce their tax
rates. Similar numbers were affected in each of the following four years. With
the introduction of the poll tax in 1990–91, again only 14 (including just two
non-metropolitan districts) were affected. However, in the second year of the
poll tax, the government decided to announce in advance expenditure limits for
all authorities.
5 This policy has been continued every subsequent year. In 1992–
93, the expenditure limits were calculated as follows:
!  the limit was to be the previous year’s budget plus 6.5 per cent unless the
resulting figure was more than 5 per cent over the current SSA, in which
case:
!  the limit was to be the previous year’s budget plus 4.5 per cent unless the
resulting figure was more than 10 per cent over the current SSA, in which
case:
!  the limit was to be the previous year’s budget plus 2.5 per cent.
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Moreover, there were some additional overriding criteria, of which the most
important was:
!  no expenditure limit was to exceed the current SSA by more than 12.5 per
cent; with the reservation that:
!  no limit was to be more than 10 per cent below the previous year’s budget.
Local government cost inflation at the time was approximately 6.6 per cent. Full
details are given by the Association of County Councils (1992, p. 129).
All authorities were expected to conform to the expenditure limits. However,
10 local authorities (including five non-metropolitan districts) chose to set
budgets significantly in excess of their limits. The Secretary of State examined
each of these on an individual basis, and instructed them to reduce their
expenditure to what he considered a reasonable level (which was, in three cases,
above the original limit).
V. A MODEL OF LOCAL EXPENDITURE
The basic model to be employed assumes that the utility, U, of a representative
voter in local authority i depends on the level of expenditure, xi, adopted (a
proxy for local services provided) and some measure of the level of local
taxation, ti. In order to build an empirical model, we must choose a particular
form of utility function, and we follow the conventional practice of assuming
that U can be represented by the equation
(2) U(xi, ti) = "1ln(xi - Ni) + "2ln(Yi - ti)
where  Ni is a measure of baseline expenditure needs in jurisdiction i,  Yi is
income and the parameters "1 and "2 are common across all jurisdictions.
Throughout, we assume that all variables are measured in per capita terms.
6
The government supports each authority i with a lump-sum grant-in-aid,
intended to equalise for differences in spending needs and fiscal capacity
between authorities. Thus the budget constraint of local authority i is given by
(3) xi = Gi + ti
where Gi is the per capita grant.
7
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7 Under a poll tax of the sort in operation in 1992–93, the tax burden is only borne by qualifying adults who
comply with the tax, while the benefits of expenditure are enjoyed by all. In principle, this refinement could
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Maximising utility subject to the budget constraint yields the expenditure
equation
(4)
That is, per capita expenditure in authority i is a function of local income (Yi),
needs (Ni) and central government grant (Ei). Note that using this model, SSA
does not enter the expenditure equation explicitly. However, it does so
implicitly, as, from equation (1), a £1 change in SSA implies a £1 change in
grant. Note also that central government grant is effectively treated as being
equivalent to a simple augmentation of private income.
In the past, most researchers have used ordinary least squares techniques to
estimate such models (see, for example, Barnett, Barrow and Smith (1991)). In
the English context, however, as noted in Section III, a case can now be made for
considering the grant variable to be endogenous, and we present a test for such
endogeneity in this paper. Moreover, we must also accommodate the expenditure
limitations imposed by central government. These effectively allow central
government to impose the simple additional constraint
(5) xi ! Li
on local authority i, where Li is the expenditure limitation imposed on the ith
authority by central government. Under these circumstances, it may be the case
that the desired level of expenditure, xi, noted above cannot be secured, in which
case the observed level of expenditure, yi, will be as follows:
(6) yi = xi if   xi ! Li
yi = Li if   xi " Li.
VI. THE EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
This section describes the empirical application to the English non-metropolitan
districts. Ordinary least squares regression methods are inadequate to estimate
the model shown above. Instead, a three-stage estimation procedure must be
adopted. This is described in full elsewhere (Duncan and Smith, 1995). In
summary, it is as follows.
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(a) First, using a subset of variables describing local socio-economic and
political characteristics, a model is developed that seeks to predict whether or
not a local authority is capped — that is, whether its expenditure choice has been
constrained by the central government limit. This is termed the selectivity model.
In the year examined, 162 of the 296 authorities spent at or within 0.1 per cent of
their expenditure limit.
(b) Using a non-identical subset of the environmental variables (or
instruments), the expected level of central government grant paid to an area is
modelled.
(c) The expenditure equation (4) is estimated taking into account the selection
for limitation implied by (a) and the endogeneity correction implied by (b). This
yields parameter estimates and predictions that model the desired level of
expenditure in each local authority.
We take per capita expenditure and grant from local authority budgets for
1992–93 from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
(1992). Income data are not directly available. However, we were able to draw
on work by Bramley and Smart (1993) in which median household weekly
incomes for English districts were inferred from published data based on the
1991 Family Expenditure Survey. We use these data as a proxy for annual per
capita income. Because they are not directly comparable to grant data, we allow
the coefficients on grant and income to differ. The components of needs, Ni, are
unknown. However, we had available a set of socio-economic indicators from
the 1991 Census of Population which could serve as possible candidates as needs
indicators. They were as follows:
Economic: unemp Percentage of economically active unemployed
l_t_unem Percentage of unemployed out of work for at least one year
moving Percentage of residents moving into district in last year
no-car Percentage of residents living in households with no cars
lone_p Percentage of population living in lone-parent families
Social: notstud Percentage of those aged 17 who are not students
sc3-5 Percentage of population in households of social class 3, 4 or 5
no_quals Percentage of population with no formal qualifications
non_white Percentage of population in non-white ethnic group
Health: illness Percentage of population with limiting long-standing illness
smr Standardised mortality ratio
lbw Number of births less than 2.5kg per 10,000 live birthsFiscal Studies
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Housing: shared Percentage of population in shared accommodation
no_ch Percentage of population with no central heating
no_facs Percentage of population without exclusive bath or WC
crowded Percentage of population living more than one person per room
These variables served two purposes. First, subsets of them served as
instruments for modelling grant selection for capping (stage (a) of the modelling
process) and the level of grant (stage (b)). Second, they were potential needs
variables. Equation (4) was therefore estimated including a subset of the 16
socio- economic variables, which represented the needs variable, Ni. The choice
of variables for this purpose was determined by the desire to keep the model as
parsimonious as possible, subject to the econometric specification being
satisfactory.
In addition to the above variables, we included in the analysis the political
control of the local authority: overall Conservative control; overall Labour
control; and other (no overall control or other party control). These were used as
dummy variables, both on the intercept term and on the coefficients of socio-
economic variables.
In making the model operational, a number of modelling decisions had to be
taken. First, a set of variables was required to model the probability of an
authority being capped, stage (a). A number of alternative sets were tested. The
version reported here uses the explanatory variables indicated in the `selection
equation’ column of Table 2. They were chosen principally on the basis of their
success in modelling whether or not an authority spent at or within 0.1 per cent
of its expenditure limit. This model successfully predicts the status of 69 per cent
of the 296 authorities.
Next, a vector of instruments was required to model grant, as in stage (b). The
choice here was more straightforward, being guided by the variables used to
calculate an authority’s SSA. The instruments in the ‘endogeneity equation’
column of Table 2 were therefore used. This equation is a good model of grant,
with an adjusted R
2 of 0.916.
The final stage of the modelling was to estimate the structural model
(equation (4)) using the methods described above. The preferred model is shown
in Table 3. It contains grant, income and political control. In addition, it was
found that limiting long-term illness and the percentage aged 17 who were not at
school were the most important ‘needs’ variables. None of the other potential
needs variables entered the model with any statistical significance at the 5 per
cent level. Furthermore, the inclusion of political dummy variables interacting
with needs variables was found to be unnecessary. The other variables included
in the model were: first, the synthetic ‘hazard’ variable, generated from stage (a),
which indicates the relative risk of being selected for expenditure limitation; and
second, the grant residual (see Table 3) which corrects for any endogeneity that
may be present in the grant variable. Neither of these was found to beLocal Government Budgetary Choices
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statistically significant. Standard errors were adjusted first for heteroskedasticity
using White’s correction, and then for the hazard of being selected for
expenditure limitation. The last column of Table 3 therefore presents the
statistically satisfactory standard errors.
The results suggest that the level of central government grant is indeed an
important determinant of expenditure levels, as is Labour Party control. Of the
needs indicators, the level of long-standing illness is clearly the most important
determinant of spending. However, we were unable to detect any statistically
significant effect of income on local government spending levels. The distinction
identified between the impact of central government grant and that of localFiscal Studies
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incomes on spending is clear evidence of the ‘fly-paper’ effect of central
government grants (Barnett, 1985), in the sense that grant appears to stimulate
expenditure to a far greater extent than private income.
By way of comparison, Table 4 shows the model that would have been
estimated if no account had been taken of the selectivity implicit in the truncated
budget constraint, or of the potential endogeneity of grant. It is an ordinary least
squares estimation of equation (4) using all 296 authorities, and yields very
different estimates of many of the parameters. In particular, it implies a stronger
impact of grant than the model in Table 3. Furthermore, the weak significance of
the ‘student’ variable suggests that it would not have been selected as a needs
variable using conventional regression methods, so that faulty inferences about
the needs determinants of local government expenditure may have been made if
this methodology had been pursued.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The correct modelling of local government expenditure choices is fraught with
difficulty, particularly given the strong influence of central government policy
decisions. This paper has sought to show how aggregate expenditure in one class
of authorities might be modelled. It shows that naïve ordinary least squares
(OLS) regressions of expenditure on potential explanatory variables are
inappropriate, and may give rise to faulty inferences about the determinants of
expenditure. This conclusion should be considered in the light of current
government methodologies for estimating local authority spending needs, whichLocal Government Budgetary Choices
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rely heavily on OLS methods. Since the year studied in this paper, the influence
of central government limitation on local government expenditure has become
even more pervasive, so that even the more advanced methods described here
may not now yield fruitful results. Indeed, there is a paradox at the heart of the
government’s efforts to identify `objective’ measures of spending needs. The
more important those estimates become, the more they influence local spending,
and the more it becomes impossible to identify independent determinants of
expenditure levels. We would therefore suggest that the entire principle of
estimating local government spending needs on the basis of naïve statistical
methods is now fatally compromised, and that a fundamental review of needs
assessment methodology is urgently needed.
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